Do hostile takeovers reduce extramarginal wage payments? by Jagadeesh Gokhale et al.
Working Paper 9215 
DO HOSTILE TAKEOVERS REDUCE 
EXTRAMARGINAL WAGE PAYMENTS? 
by Jagadeesh Gokhale,  Erica L. Groshen, 
and David Neumark 
Jagadeesh Gokhale and Erica L. Groshen 
are economists at the Federal Reserve Bank of 
Cleveland.  David Neumark is an assistant 
professor of economics at the University of 
Pennsylvania and a faculty research fellow of 
the National Bureau of Economic Research.  The 
authors are grateful to Steven Sharpe for 
helpful discussions and to Colin Drozdowski and 
Edward Bryden for research assistance. 
Working papers of the Federal Reserve Bank of 
Cleveland are preliminary materials circulated 
to stimulate discussion and critical comment. 
The views stated herein are those of the authors 
and not necessarily those of the Federal Reserve 
Bank of Cleveland or of the Board of Governors 
of the Federal Reserve System. 
December 1992 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmABSTRACT 
Hostile takeovers may have significant implications for long-term 
employment contracts if they facilitate the opportunistic expropriation of 
extramarginal wage payments.  We test the expropriation hypothesis by studying 
the relationship  between proxies for extramarginal wage payments and 
subsequent  hostile takeover activity.  This paper improves on existing 
research by using firm-  and establishment-level  data from a salary survey of 
employers.  In  addition,  we observe characteristics of wage and employment 
structures  both before and after the occurrence of a hostile takeover and 
hence can see whether the data are consistent with reductions in extramarginal 
wage payments following such takeovers. Results from this ex post experiment 
provide evidence consistent with the hypothesis that hostile takeovers result 
in reductions of extramarginal wage payments to more-tenured  workers,  mostly 
through cutbacks in senior positions at firms with relatively steep wage 
profiles. 
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Hostile takeovers may have significant implications for long-term 
employment contracts.  Shleifer and Summers (1988) argue that hostile 
takeovers may facilitate opportunistic behavior at the expense of workers by 
making possible the removal of "entrenched"  managers who would otherwise 
uphold implicit contracts with employees.  Their argument is based not on the 
presence of reputation effects,  but rather on the hypothesis that because of 
management loyalty--an  ingredient necessary to make implicit contracts in the 
first place--a  long-time  manager tends to avoid breaking implicit contracts 
with employees even when doing so would benefit shareholders.  Neumark and 
Sharpe (1992) contend that hostile takeovers may facilitate such opportunistic 
behavior even if there are reputation effects.  The new management taking 
command after an unfriendly takeover breaks the implicit contracts of the 
previous managers and therefore may not suffer a damaged reputation.  This is 
especially likely if the takeover is engineered by an individual or company 
that then resells the target firm.l 
Neumark and Sharpe (1992) conduct an ex ante analysis of this question, 
studying the relationship between proxies for extramarginal wage payments and 
subsequent  hostile takeover activity.  They construct two types of proxies for 
extramarginal wage payments: differences in wage levels unattributable to 
measured human capital and other standard wage equation controls in the 
industries in which firms conduct business, and differences both in the 
steepness of age-earnings  profiles and in the relative employment of older 
l~ha~at,  Shleifer,  and Vishny (1990) argue that because corporate raiders 
typically resell acquired assets to firms in similar industries,  hostile 
takeovers are largely an "industrial organization problem," resolving issues 
similar to those that trigger friendly mergers, and were perhaps spurred by 
lenient antitrust enforcement in the 1980s that released pent-up demand for 
acquisitions in related industries.  The argument in Neumark and Sharpe,  which 
emphasizes reputation effects, suggests another reason why other firms are 
interested in acquiring hostile takeover targets from raiders. 
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evidence, albeit weak,  consistent with the view that hostile takeovers are 
used to expropriate extramarginal wages.  Specifically,  proxies for 
extramarginal wage payments sometimes have predictive power for an eventual 
hostile takeover attempt, although this power tends to diminish as controls 
for firm financial characteristics are added.  The results in that paper are 
interpreted as a joint test of two hypotheses: 1)  that the characteristics of 
the wage structure captured in these proxies actually represent extramarginal 
wage payments and 2)  that hostile takeovers target firms with relatively high 
extramarginal wage payments. 
This paper improves on that empirical analysis in two important ways. 
First,  Neumark and Sharpe use industry-level  characteristics of the wage 
structure and then construct firm-level  proxies for extramarginal wage 
payments by assigning industry-level  data to firms in Compustat based on the 
industry or industries in which these firms conduct business.  In contrast, in 
this paper we use firm-  and establishment-level  data from a salary survey of 
employers,  similar to that used in Groshen (1991~). These data should yield 
better proxies for extramarginal wages at the firm or establishment level, 
given evidence of firm-specific  wage differentials within industries (Groshen 
[1991a,  1991bl).  Second, these data permit more than an ex ante experiment. 
Because we can observe characteristics of the establishment's wage and 
employment structures both before and after the occurrence of a hostile 
takeover,  we can see whether the data are consistent with firms in fact 
expropriating extramarginal wages following hostile takeovers,  by examining 
changes in extramarginal  wage payments.  This analysis may reveal effects of 
hostile takeovers that are obscured by heterogeneity bias in the ex ante 
analysis.  Furthermore,  these data cover the same reporting unit (one or a 
number of establishments) before and after the takeover, so there is no 
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rather than to the new parent company. 
11. Extramareinal Wages 
A considerable amount of research in labor economics documents evidence 
that is consistent with extramarginal wages and attempts to provide related 
theoretical models.  One focus of this research has been industry-  and firm- 
specific wage premia.  In  wage regressions that control for variables that 
economic theory suggests ought to determine wages,  substantial industry wage 
differentials persist (Krueger and Summers [1988]).  Some explanations that 
have been considered and rejected are compensating differentials (Murphy and 
Tope1 [1987]), unobserved ability (Gibbons and Katz [1992],  Blackburn and 
Neumark [1992]), demand or supply shifts (Helwege [1992]),  and union threat 
effects (Newark and Wachter [1992]). 
This evidence of industry-level  wage differentials has been supplemented 
with evidence of persistent,  unexplained wage differences at the firm and 
establishment level (Groshen [1991a]).  Employer wage differentials within 
industry are about the same size as differences between industries,  are linked 
to observable characteristics of the establishments (such as size, technology, 
product, and unionization),  and appear to be long-lived (Groshen [1991b]). 
Some researchers,  such as Dickens and Katz (1987a,  1987b), have 
concluded that these industry-,  firm-,  and establishment-level  wage 
differentials reflect rents.  Such rents arise in the gift-exchange  model of 
Akerlof (1982),  in which workers receive above-market-clearing  wages (in some 
firms) in return for exerting more-than-minimal  effort.  They can also arise 
if firms base wages partly on ability to pay,  perhaps out of equity concerns 
(see the review in Levine [1991]). 
A second labor market model that leads to the payment of extramarginal 
wages,  although only to more-tenured  workers, is the incentive contract model 
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who therefore have some incentive to shirk on the job.  To eliminate or reduce 
shirking,  firms pay workers less than their marginal product when their tenure 
is low,  and more than their marginal product when their tenure is high.  In 
this deferred compensation scheme,  employees essentially post a "bond" that is 
forfeited if they are caught shirking.  They are willing to accept the 
deferred-compensation  implicit contract ex ante because it results in greater 
output,  and hence a higher present value of earnings, relative to the spot 
market outcome. 
Empirical research on  Lazear contracts seeks to distinguish the deferred 
compensation explanation of rising wages from the general human capital 
investment explanation.  In  particular, this research asks whether wages rise 
faster than marginal product, consistent with Lazear's model, or rise in 
concert with marginal product.  Numerous researchers have found evidence 
consistent  with wages rising faster than marginal product (Medoff and Abraham 
[1981],  Lazear and Moore [1984],  Kotlikoff and Wise  [1985],  Kotlikoff and 
Gokhale [1991]),  although others have argued to the contrary (Brown [1989]). 
Based on these two avenues of research,  we construct two measures of 
possible payments of extramarginal wages for our sample of firms.  First,  to 
2~n  alternative hypothesis under which workers receive less than their 
marginal product when young,  and more when old, is that workers prefer rising 
wage profiles as a forced-saving  mechanism (Frank and Hutchens [1992], 
Loewenstein  and Sicherman [1991]).  In  this case,  however,  workers sacrifice 
their present value of earnings in order to receive deferred compensation. 
Nonetheless,  older workers are still paid extramarginal wages.  Neumark (1992) 
provides some evidence consistent  with the forced-saving  hypothesis.  Neumark 
and Taubman (1992) exploit the different implications of alternative 
explanations of  wage growth for present values of earnings streams to 
distinguish among the explanations. 
There is also a version of the human capital model (Carmichael [1983]) 
with the same empirical implications.  In  this paper,  we do not distinguish 
between the Lazear model and these models; any evidence regarding the validity 
of one bears equally on the others.  Thus,  our research sheds light on the 
existence of extramarginal wage payments to older,  more-tenured  workers,  but 
does not address the source of these payments. 
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unexplained fixed establishment component of wages.  Second,  to examine 
extramarginal payments to more-tenured  workers, we construct estimates of the 
steepness of the wage profile at the firm level,  as well as the relative 
employment of senior-level  workers.  The particular combination of steep 
profiles plus high employment of more-tenured  workers should be most consonant 
with this latter type of extramarginal  wage payment. 
111. Existine Research on Hostile Takeovers 
A number of recent papers look at the consequences of alternative types 
of corporate restructurings for wages,  pensions, and employment (for example, 
Lichtenberg and Siege1 [1989],  Brown and Medoff [1988]); a subset of these 
focus on hostile takeovers.  One obstacle to studying hostile takeovers 
explicitly is that it is difficult to attribute changes that occur for the 
acquiring firm to the acquired entity per se.  Thus, studies of the 
consequences of these takeovers have used unusual, specially constructed 
samples.  Bhagat, Shleifer,  and Vishny  (1990) and Bhide (1989) study a small 
sample of firms that were hostile takeover targets, finding that substantial 
layoffs are frequently reported at target firms following such events, 
although they conclude that layoffs explain only a fraction (11 to 26 percent) 
of the takeover premium for their firms.  One problem with these studies is 
that they consider only hostile takeover targets; they are constrained to do 
this because they do not use standard data sources (such as Compustat) to 
attribute changes to the acquired entity.3 Thus, there is no "control group" 
of firms that fail to experience takeover bids.  On the other hand, firms that 
did not experience such bids may have taken actions similar to those that 
3~hagat,  Shleifer, and Vishny do present some partial evidence, based on 
Wall Street Journal reports of industry and firm layoffs, that layoffs were 
higher in hostile target firms than in similar nontarget firms and that the 
higher layoffs followed the takeover (or attempt). 
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targets to nontargets would understate the effects of hostile takeovers. 
In contrast,  for a sample of union contracts matched to firms,  Rosett 
(1990) finds that hostile takeovers (identified as takeovers accompanied by 
CEO changes) do not result in lower real wage growth than friendly takeovers 
(in specifications excluding year and industry effects) and have no 
discernible impact on real wage growth (in specifications including these 
effects).  One problem with this sample,  however, is that the union contracts 
apply to only a fraction of the firms' work forces,  so it is difficult to 
generalize to real wage changes for all employees. 
None of these papers,  however,  addresses explicitly the question of the 
expropriation of extramarginal  wages or, in the language of Shleifer and 
Summers (1988),  breaches of implicit contracts.  That is,  none attempts to 
identify components of wage levels that are in any sense extramarginal,  and 
none focuses on the steepness of the wage profile or on the relative 
employment of more-tenured  workers.  As outlined in section 11,  however, it is 
these characteristics of wages and employment that may indicate the existence 
of implicit contracts.  Instead,  the studies reviewed so far focus on  wage or 
employment cuts per se,  which have nothing to do with reducing extramarginal 
wage payments,  and therefore may have nothing to do with the gains from 
hostile  takeover^.^  These limitations of existing studies are imposed by the 
data, since none of the standard data sources (such as Compustat or the Census 
Bureau's  Longitudinal Research Database) or the nonstandard sources used to 
date (as in Bhagat,  Shleifer,  and Vishny [1990]) contains information on the 
shape of the wage profile, on the relative employment of older workers, or on 
4~his  point is recognized explicitly in Bhagat, Schleifer,  and Vishny 
(1990),  but the authors nonetheless estimate savings from layoffs as the wage 
bill previously paid to laid-off  workers. 
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level that is not attributable to worker productivity. 
In contrast, the empirical analysis in Newark and Sharpe (1992),  like 
the analysis in this paper, attempts to construct measures of extramarginal 
wage payments, or indicators of implicit contracts,  and to study their 
relationship to hostile takeover bids.  They consider a number of proxies for 
extramarginal wages: the overall wage level,  the steepness of the age-earnings 
profile,  the relative employment of older workers, and the steepness of the 
profile interacted with the relative employment of older workers.  The study 
is also different from others in the literature because it is ex ante in 
nature, studying whether these extramarginal wage proxies, measured at a point 
in time,  are associated with later hostile takeover bids.  Thus,  the authors 
can use standard data sources (such as Compustat) to compare hostile targets 
and other firms,  but still avoid the attribution problem referred to above. 
Newark and Sharpe find that these proxies for extramarginal  wage 
payments are positively related to hostile takeover bids, in logit estimates 
for the probability of hostile takeovers, although the effects are often 
statistically insignificant once controls for financial and other 
characteristics of firms are included;  the results are strongest for the 
interaction between the steepness of the age-earnings  profile and the relative 
employment of older workers.  Given that they use industry-level  proxies for 
extramarginal wages,  which are matched to firms based on the industry or 
industries in which the firms conduct business, it is perhaps surprising that 
much of a relationship is detected,  even if the expropriation  hypothesis is 
correct.  Also, they find that the effects of the extramarginal wage proxies 
are generally strongest  when comparing hostile takeover targets to other 
corporate restructurings.  They interpret this as providing stronger evidence 
in favor of the expropriation or breach-of-contract  hypothesis,  since it is 
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the unique aspect of  hostile takeovers--the  change in  management. 
An alternative avenue,  which focuses more explicitly on expropriation of 
extramarginal compensation  or breaches of implicit contracts,  investigates 
defined-benefit  pension plan terminations and reversions of excess assets from 
overfunded plans.5  Employees can lose out from a termination because the 
explicit sponsor's obligation to current jobholders upon termination is based 
only on wages at that date rather than on  wages at retirement.  Firms may be 
tempted to terminate and revert because of the overfunding that results from 
the requirement that they fund plans based on  projected salaries at 
retirement.  This research finds some evidence (although not one-sided) 
consistent with hostile takeovers leading to terminations and reversions as 
breaches of implicit contracts (Pontiff,  Shleifer, and Weisbach [1990], 
Mittelstaedt [1991], Ippolito and James [1992]). 
To summarize,  most existing evidence on the effects of hostile takeovers 
on wages and employment does not speak directly to whether such takeovers ar'e 
a means of expropriating extramarginal wage payments or of breaching implicit 
contracts.  Evidence on  pension plan terminations and reversions is more 
relevant to the expropriation hypothesis and provides some (although not one- 
sided) support.  This paper extends the approach taken in  Neumark and Sharpe 
(1992),  of looking at the relationship between hostile takeovers and 
characteristics of the wage structure and employment that may indicate 
extramarginal wage payments or implicit contracts.  This paper is unique 
5~etersen  (1992) provides empirical evidence supporting the notion that 
reversions are breaches of implicit contracts of a Lazear nature. 
%en  a pension plan is terminated,  the firm has the option of buying 
annuities with a value equal to the explicit pension obligations,  based on 
current salaries,  or replacing the plan with one of at least that value.  In 
cases where the plan is overfunded,  the firm can retain the assets left over. 
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employment structures at the firm or establishment level and because the 
nature of the data set used permits both an ex ante and ex post analysis. 
IV. The Data 
A.  The Community Salary Survey 
We use data from 1980 through 1991,  constructed from the annual 
Community Salary Survey (CSS) conducted by the Federal Reserve Bank of 
Cleveland (FRBC) personnel department.  The survey,  which covers employers in 
Cleveland, Cincinnati,  and Pittsburgh,  assists in annual salary budgeting at 
the Bank.7  In return for their participation, surveyed companies are issued 
result books for their own use.  Salary surveys such as the CSS currently 
offer the only source of longitudinal wage data accompanied by both detailed 
occupation and information  on employers.' 
The FRBC chooses participants in each city to be representative of large 
employers in area.g  Each one judges which establishments to include in the 
7~n  general,  Cleveland, Cincinnati,  and Pittsburgh are more urban,  have 
more cyclically sensitive employment,  and have undergone more industrial 
restructuring than the nation as a whole.  Prior to the 1980s,  wages in these 
three cities were higher than the national average.  Now, they are 
approximately average for the country. 
'see  Hotchkiss (1990) for a summary of data sets with information on 
employers.  For example, the microdata collected in Industry Wage Surveys and 
Area Wage Surveys by the Bureau of Labor Statistics have occupational detail, 
but lack any way to identify changes in ownership, are not easily linked over 
time,  and are not preserved for long periods.  Unemployment Insurance ES-202 
data,  when available,  report average employee earnings by employer,  not 
individual wages, and lack occupational detail.  The Longitudinal Research 
Database,  maintained by the Center for Economic Studies, goes back to 1972, 
but covers only manufacturers and provides only mean establishment earnings 
for production and nonproduction  workers,  with no occupational detail. 
9~o  check whether the wages paid by members of the CSS sample were 
unrepresentative of the areas' rates,  wages in the survey were compared to 
Bureau of Labor Statistics' Area Wage Surveys (AWS) in the same cities for the 
late 1970s and early 1980s.  The AWS also oversamples large employers. 
Movements of mean wages for similar occupations were found to be highly 
correlated across the two surveys,  and levels were usually within 5 percent of 
each other. 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmsurvey,  according to their internal organization.  Some include all branches 
in the metropolitan area,  while others report wages for only a single 
facility.  We use the purposely vague term "employer" to mean the employing 
firm,  establishment, division, or collection of local establishments for which 
the participant reports wages.  lo 
The industries included vary widely, although the emphasis is on 
obtaining employers with many "matches,"  or employees in the occupations 
surveyed.  The number of companies participating on an ongoing basis in these 
years averages about 93.  Overall, 133 employers participated in the survey at 
one time or another over these 12  years and had enough data for use in the 
analysis.  l1 
The CSS covers 75 occupations each year;  each employer reports wages for 
an average of 28 of these.  The surveyed occupations are almost exclusively 
nonproduction  jobs,  since these positions are found in all industries. 
Included are office,  maintenance, technical,  supervisory,  and professional 
personnel. 
Many jobs are further divided into a number of grade levels,  depending 
on required responsibilities and experience.  Job descriptions for each are at 
/ 
least two paragraphs long.  In consGltation  with the FRBC personnel 
department,  we grouped 50 (two-thirds)  of the surveyed occupations into 17  job 
"families."  Each family comprises at least two,  and up to as many as five, 
levels.  Appendix A presents a list of the job families and levels (with their 
associated job titles) used in the analysis. 
1°since'a  participant's  choice of the entities to  include presumably 
reflects those for which wage and personnel policies are actually administered 
jointly,  the ambiguity here is not particularly troublesome. 
"~welve  companies  had no employees in any of the job families used to 
estimate extramarginal wages.  Thus,  they had to be excluded from the 
, analysis,  although they were used to estimate overall establishment 
differentials  . 
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individual employed in a surveyed occupation  by a surveyed employer.  Cash 
bonuses are included as salary,  but fringe  benefits are not. 
B. Identification of Takeovers 
Takeovers,  whether hostile or not,  were identified by a combination of 
four methods.  In 1989 and 1990,  participants were asked if they had had a 
change of ownership during the past five years and, if so,  by whom they had 
been acquired.  We also looked up the CUSIP number of all publicly held firms 
and took any change in number as an indication of a possible takeover.  Then 
Moodv's, the Harris Industrial Directory,  and Mergers and Acauisitions 
magazine were consulted in order to characterize the takeover.  In a few 
cases,  the company contact for the CSS was also consulted to make a final 
determination. 
C. Ex Ante Observations vs. Ex Post Observations 
We organize the data into ex ante and ex post observations.  Ex ante 
observations are taken for the first year the employer enters the sample and 
are described in table 1A.  In  most cases,  the year of entry is 1980,  but 55 
employers join the sample at some later date. In the first column,  we see that 
employers represent all industry groups,  but are most heavily concentrated in 
durable goods manufacturing and in finance,  insurance,  and real estate (FIRE). 
The other columns divide the sample into four categories: 34 employers that 
were not candidates for takeover (governmental  agencies,  public utilities,  or 
nonprofit organizations),  67  potential candidates that had no change of 
ownership, 25 entities that were acquired in a (nonhostile) merger or 
acquisition,  and 7 employers that underwent hostile takeovers.12 
Table 1B reports sample characteristics for the 97  observations with 
12For reasons of confidentiality  , we cannot divulge the names of the 
companies from which the data were collected. 
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lost are unmerged candidates or employers that underwent friendly mergers. 
Noncandidates have strikingly higher rates of unionization (UNION,  defined as 
at least 25 percent unionized) and average size (SIZE) than do candidates. 
Among candidates,  employers that did not undergo friendly mergers or hostile 
takeovers are larger but less unionized than those that did. 
Ex post observations are defined from the first year observed (usually 
1980) until the last year observed (usually 1991).  Table 2 reports sample 
characteristics  for this sample.  It is smaller (121 observations) than the ex 
ante data set because employers that participated only once in the CSS (mostly 
in Pittsburgh),  or for which an observation after a merger or takeover 
occurred was unavailable, are excluded.  l3  The industrial distribution 
remains about the same.  We divide the sample into three subgroups: 101 
employers that were not merged (noncandidates plus intact candidates),  14 
mergers and acquisitions,  and 6  hostile takeovers.  On average, our 
observations on the wage and employment structure occur 3.7 years after 
hostile takeovers, and 2.5 years after mergers and acquisitions. 
The ex post analysis looks at changes in the variables describing the 
wage and employment structures.  Using the data in difference form controls 
for all static differences among these employers.  The more direct forms of 
controlling for differences among employers,  such as merging in data from 
other sources (Compustat,  for example),  cannot be used for the ex post 
analysis (the unique contribution of the paper) because financial data for 
units within firms are not available. 
 here were two observations with mergers/acquisitions for which the 
date of the merger occurred immediately before the first year the company was 
observed.  These are included in the ex ante data set as nonmergers,  but are 
excluded from the ex post data set because some effects of the earlier mergers 
may take a number of years to occur. 
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survey.  If this generates any selection bias, it seems to us most plausible 
that hostile takeover targets that experience particularly severe changes 
related to expropriation  of extramarginal wages (such as large-scale  firing of 
older workers) may be most likely to discontinue participation.  This would 
bias the results against finding evidence consistent with the expropriation 
hypothesis. 
D.  Measures of Extramarginal Wages 
We use three conceptually distinct, employer-specific  measures of the 
presence of extramarginal wages: overall wage differentials,  wage profile 
slope differentials,  and employment concentration in senior levels.  We also 
interact the slope and concentration measures as a proxy for the size of the 
.seniority-related  extramarginal wage bill. 
Employer wage differentials (such as unexplained deviations from mean 
wages in a city) are estimated independently for each city and year,  from an 
OLS regression of log median wages for each occupation in each employer, 
controlling for detailed occupation (following Groshen [1991aJ).  Estimated 
coefficients on employer dummies (after standardizing the mean to zero for 
each city-year)  are denoted LEVMED,  and represent the average log wage 
differential across occupations paid by that employer in that year.  l4 
Similarly, employer slope differentials capture the extent to which the 
slope of an employer's wage profile deviates from its annual city mean.  We 
base our estimates on the 17  job families that were found in the occupations 
surveyed in the CSS (see appendix A).  Employer-specific  steepness of 
age-earnings  profiles is estimated in the same nonparametric way as employer 
wage differentials.  In  every case where two occupations in a family are 
14~og-point  wage differentials can  be interpreted as approximate 
percentage-point  differences from the mean. 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmobserved at a single employer,  the difference in the mean of log wages between 
the steps is used as a dependent variable for the regression of wage gaps on a 
set of fully interacted family-step  dummies and a set of employer dummies. 
The estimated employer coefficients are labeled WGDIF and measure the average 
seniority-wage  slope difference (relative to the mean in the city and year) 
paid by the employer in a particular year.  A positive number for a company 
reflects above-average  wage differences between steps in these 17 job-family 
ladders among their employees. 
Finally,  to measure the relative seniority of the work force,  we 
estimate what we call the "employment  concentration" for each CSS participant. 
The log employment difference between steps in a job-family  ladder is 
regressed on the same set of dummy variables (for all possible family-step 
combinations and for employers) used in the slope estimates.  The estimated 
employer coefficients are retained;  a positive coefficient,  labeled EMPDIF, 
reflects an above-average  concentration (within their city in that year) of 
senior employees in these job ladders. 
V. Results 
A. Ex Ante Tests: The Effects of Wage and Employment Structures on the 
Probability of Hostile Takeovers 
Descriptive statistics for the wage and employment structure  variables 
for the ex ante analysis are reported in the last rows of tables 1A and 1B. 
As a group,  the seven companies that underwent hostile takeovers had the 
lowest average wages (LEVMED),  relatively flat seniority profiles (WGDIF),  and 
the highest concentration of workers in senior job classifications (EMPDIF). 
However, these differences between groups are small relative to the variation 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmwithin groups.  l5 
We now turn to a more formal investigation of whether establishment- 
level employment distributions and wage structures are related to the 
probability of a hostile takeover.  For each firm,  the estimates of the 
employer-specific  log median wage differential (LEVMED), log inter-job-level 
wage difference (WGDIF),  and log inter-job-level  employment difference 
(EMPDIF) are used to predict the occurrence of a hostile takeover.  For firms 
that underwent a hostile takeover,  we ensure that these estimates are for a 
year prior to the year of the takeover. 
To reiterate,  WGDIF serves as a proxy for extramarginal wage premia paid 
to more-tenured  workers, and EMPDIF is an index of employment concentration in 
upper-level  jobs.  But wage or employment differences alone need not reflect 
high overall rent payouts to employees.  Firms with high employment 
concentration in upper-level  jobs but with small wage differences across job 
levels or,  conversely,  those with high wage slopes but with relatively low 
employment in upper-level  jobs,  may not be attractive hostile-takeover  targets 
because both of these cases are unlikely to be associated with substantial 
extramarginal wage payments to more-tenured  workers.  However, the joint 
incidence of relatively high employment in senior job levels and high inter- 
job-level  wage slopes may represent  high overall extramarginal payments that 
could be susceptible to expropriation.  Thus,  the interaction variable WGXEM, 
computed as the product of WGDIF and EMPDIF,  provides the strongest test of 
the expropriation  hypothesis with respect to extramarginal wages paid to more- 
tenured workers.  LEVMED is used to explore whether overall wage-level 
differences across firms affect the probability of hostile takeovers. 
15The means for the whole sample are different from zero because the 
observations come from different years;  only within a year is the average 
firm-specific  differential equal to zero. 
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sample is restricted to firms that were candidates for a hostile takeover. 
The first nine columns show the regressions on a subsample with nonmissing 
data on union status,  UN,  and the log of firm size,  LNSIZE.  This subsample 
contains 7 firms that experienced a hostile takeover during the period spanned 
by the data,  and 64  that did not.  Table 4  reports results when the 
noncandidates are included.  The signs of the estimated coefficients of LEVMED 
and WGDIF are negative,  reflecting the differentials in tables 1A and 1B.  The 
estimated coefficients of WGXEM and EMPDIF are almost always positive.  These 
signs are robust to the inclusion of  UN and LNSIZE in the regressions (columns 
5 through 9),  to the inclusion in the sample of firms with missing data on  UN 
and LNSIZE (columns 10 through 13),  and to the inclusion of nontakeover 
candidates in the regressions (table 4). 
Results for all of these samples suggest that a more-senior  work force 
(EMPDIF) is positively related to probability of hostile takeovers, except in 
regressions that control for LEVMED,  WGDIF, and WGXEM (column 9 in tables 3 
and 4).  The probability of a hostile takeover based on a one-standard- 
deviation increase in each independent variable (holding the others at their 
means)  is shown in  brackets below each coefficient estimate; these can be 
compared to the probability at the means, in the last row of the table.  l6 
For example, in column 7 of table 3,  increasing the interaction  between 
seniority and profile steepness (WGXEM) by one standard deviation raises the 
probability of a hostile takeover from 0.10 to 0.12. 
While none of the estimated coefficients of the wage and employment 
structure  variables is statistically  significant,  the signs of the estimated 
coefficients point to several conclusions.  First,  higher wage levels per se 
l6J?or the probit model, in contrast to the logit model, the estimated 
probability at the means need not exactly equal the unconditional probability. 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmare not positively associated with hostile takeover probabilities.  Second, 
high wage differentials between job levels do not attract predators.  Third, 
the positive signs on the interaction variable,  WGXEM, suggest that firms with 
higher wage payouts to senior workers in conjunction with high employment 
concentrations in senior-level  jobs are more likely to experience a hostile 
takeover.  These results are consistent with Neumark and Sharpe's (1992) 
findings in favor of the expropriation hypothesis that extramarginal wage 
premia induce hostile takeovers,  but,  as in that paper, the evidence is not 
statistically strong. In addition,  presumably the inclusion of financial 
controls would,  as found by Neumark and Sharpe, further weaken these results. 
Fourth, support is weak at best for the hypothesis that a higher employment 
concentration in upper-level  jobs,  by itself,  leads to a higher probability of 
a hostile takeover. 
B. Ex Post Tests: The Effects of Hostile Takeovers on Wage and Employment 
Structures 
As shown in the last rows of table 2,  in the ex post observations, 
employer-specific  wage differentials rose most rapidly for employers that 
experienced a hostile takeover (ALEVMED).  However, the concentration of 
employees in senior positions drops dramatically following hostile takeovers 
(AEMPDIF), while it rises after a merger.  Wage profiles seem to be relatively 
unaffected (AWGDIF). 
The effects of hostile takeovers on firm wage and employment structures 
are analyzed using data on the last year available for each firm.  For firms 
that underwent a hostile takeover,  we ensure that this year is later than the 
year of takeover.  OLS regressions are estimated for differences in LEVMED, 
WGDIF,  WGXEM, and EMPDIF (denoted with A's)  between the last and first years 
of data availability, ensuring that for firms that were taken over, the change 
occurred in an intervening year.  The differences are regressed on a dummy 
17 
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Table 5 reports results from two sets of regressions, the second set 
containing an additional regressor,  YRAFTH, indicating the span between the 
year of takeover and the year to which the changes are computed.  The 
coefficients on H are negative in the AWGXEM and AEMPDIF regressions,  but only 
the coefficient on AWGXEM is significant (at the 10  percent level).  The AWGDIF 
regression  produces a positive estimated coefficient that is not significant, 
suggesting that inter-job  wage differences remain substantially unchanged 
after hostile takeovers. 
The inclusion of YRAFTH in the regression preserves the negative signs 
on both AWGXEM and AEMPDIF and renders the coefficient for AWGXEM more 
strongly significant.  These coefficient estimates indicate that hostile 
takeovers are followed by relatively large reductions in employment 
concentration in senior positions and in employment-weighted  wage slopes.  The 
positive coefficients on YRAFTH in the AWGXEM and AEMPDIF regressions suggest 
that the initial reductions in these variables after a hostile takeover are 
partially reversed over time. 
This apparent reversal could stem from at least two sources.  In line 
with the hypothesis advanced here, suppose hostile predators extract 
extramarginal rents from more-senior  workers at the time of takeover,  but do 
not change the Lazear-type  bonding offered to continuing or new employees.  If 
Lazear contracts are efficient and the new parent's offer is credible (because 
the company has been resold or the predator is expected to honor its own 
implicit contracts),  then wage profiles would be unchanged after the takeover, 
and, for example, the drop in the seniority concentration of workers would 
dissipate over time.  The second possibility is related to the fact that the 
changes in the wage and employment structures for the earliest takeovers in 
the sample were observed over the longest period; it is possible that the 
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Under this interpretation, the positive coefficients on  YRAFTH in the AWGXEM 
and AEMPDIF regressions,  and the stronger effects of hostile takeovers on 
these variables once YRAFTH is included,  suggest that the reductions in 
extramarginal wage payments were larger in the later takeovers.  This is 
consistent with evidence in  Kaplan and Stein (1991),  showing that going- 
private transactions had higher prices relative to cash flow in the latter 
half of the 1980s,  which  suggests that in order to service the debt incurred 
in these later transactions,  reductions in the claims of other stakeholders 
(such as more-tenured  workers) were more likely. 
In the case of ALEVMED, the coefficient on H is positive and 
significant.  The sign and significance are preserved when YRAFTH is included 
in the regression.  This positive effect on the post-hostile-takeover  wage 
levels may reflect "house cleaning" by the new owners/managers as some of the 
less-efficient  workers are fired.  Or, it may reflect an  attempt to retain the 
more-efficient  workers in response to perceived increases in their job- 
separation  probabilities in light of the abrogation of implicit wage contracts 
with senior  workers.  However, if hostile takeovers do reduce extramarginal 
wage payments, then this result may imply that overall employer wage 
differentials do not reflect extramarginal  wages.17 
Table 6  shows the same set of regressions with additional controls for 
nonhostile mergers and akquisitions,  M and YRAFTM.  The addition of these 
variables does not substantially change the signs and standard errors on any 
of the coefficients on  H and YRAFTH.  More interesting is the fact that none 
17~lternatively,  it is possible that these extramarginal wage payments 
are not reduced following hostile takeovers,  while those paid to more-tenured 
workers are decreased.  Since the two types of extramarginal wage payments may 
have different sources, it is conceivable that only the expropriation of the 
latter type is profitable from the perspective of an acquiring firm. 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmof the estimated coefficients of the dummy variable for nonhostile mergers is 
significant and,  in most cases,  the signs are opposite those on H.  Thus, the 
reductions in employment concentrations in senior positions and in employment- 
weighted inter-job  wage differences,  and the increases in median wage levels 
following hostile takeovers,  stand in contrast to the movements in these 
variables following mergers and acquisitions. 
The preservation of the negative and significant  coefficient on H in the 
AWGXEM regression is consistent  with the hypothesis that post-hostile-takeover 
restructuring results in an expropriation of extramarginal payments to the 
more-tenured  workers of firms.  The results for AEMPDIF and AWGDIF suggest 
that most of the reduction in extramarginal payments occurs not through 
reductions in inter-job  wage differentials,  but through reductions in 
employment concentrations in  upper-level  jobs. 
VI.  Discussion of Interviews 
After obtaining a complete set of results,  we contacted each hostile 
takeover target in our sample, in order to add qualitative evidence to our 
findings.  We were able to speak with current personnel officers at five of 
the seven targets. 
After confirming the history of the takeover,  we asked open-ended 
questions about the adjustment process and ensuing changes in personnel 
policy.  In all cases,  the respondents reported substantial employment 
restructuring,  continuing for as long as three years after the takeover.  In 
each case,  most of the effort was directed at thinning out middle management. 
Often, employees were encouraged to leave through early retirement plans or 
"voluntary separation agreements" (including severance payments based on 
seniority).  In three cases,  a substantial number of workers were laid off or 
fired, after an evaluation of each person and hisher  position. 
Consistent with our quantitative results,  wage levels and differentials 
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packages and incentive programs underwent substantial change to bring them in 
line with parent company policies.  A number of respondents reported that 
pension plans proved hardest to redesign or replace,  so the plans were usually 
left intact.  Finally,  we note that four of the seven respondents  have had 
another change of ownership since the hostile takeover. 
VII. Conclusion 
The ex ante results do not provide evidence that extramarginal wages 
paid to all workers in a firm,  or to more-tenured  workers, are associated with 
subsequent hostile takeovers.  However, the ex post results do provide 
evidence consistent  with the hypothesis that hostile takeovers result in 
reduced extramarginal  wage payments to more-tenured  workers, mostly through 
cutbacks in employment in senior positions.  Furthermore, the signs of the 
estimated coefficients from the ex ante analysis are consistent with the 
targeting of such payments in  hostile takeovers; the term for the interaction 
between inter-job-level  employment difference and the slope of the wage 
profile is positively associated,  ex ante,  with hostile takeovers,  even if the 
results are not statistically significant.  The evidence from the ex post 
analysis is consistent  with findings suggesting that pension plan terminations 
and reversions of excess assets,  entailing breaches of implicit Lazear-type 
contracts,  are more likely to follow hostile takeovers. 
One implication  of these findings is that an active market for corporate 
control may weaken Lazear-type  bonding solutions to the effort-extraction 
problem in the labor market.  If the prices at which hostile takeovers are 
transacted reflect the costs and benefits of this bonding, then these findings 
do not necessarily imply any inefficiency generated by the market for 
corporate control.  But if hostile takeover premia indicate short-term  gains 
from expropriating extramarginal wages,  but not longer-term  costs of the 
2  1 
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prove destructive.  Because employees in some companies may come to discount 
the value of their long-term  implicit contracts as other companies abrogate 
theirs, the social costs of hostile takeovers may not be reflected in the 
prices at which firms trade. 
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clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmTable 1A:  Ex Ante Observations. Complete Sample 
Unmerged 
Whole Sample  Noncandidates  Candidates  Merners/Acsuisitions  Hostile Takeovers 
Number of 


























Finance, insurance, and 
real estate 
Miscellaneous services 
Professional  services 
Government 
Employer wage and 
employment differentials 
LEVMF.D  (wage level)  -0.026  0.009  -0.027  -0.067  -0.065 
(0.167)  (0.142)  (0.173)  (0.192)  (0.116) 
WGDIF (wage profile  0.009  -0.022  0.018  0.037  -0.020 
steepness)  (0.104)  (0.086)  (0.113)  (0.089)  (0.113) 
-IF  (employment  -0.041  -0.087  -0.027  -0.042  0.035 
seniority)  (0.596)  (0.601)  (0.620)  (0.591)  (0.374) 
Cell  counts are reported,  except for employer  wage and employment  differentials,  where means are reported, with atandarc 
deviations in parentheses. 
Source:  Authors'  calculations. 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmTable 1B: Ex Ante Observations, Semple with Unionization and Employer Size Data 
Unmerged 
Whole Sample  Noncandidates  Candidates  Merners/Acauisitions  Hostile Takeovers 
Number of 


























Finance, insurance, and 
real estate 
Miscellaneous services 
Professional  services 
Government 
Employer wage and 
employment differentials 
LEVMED (wage level)  -0.038  0.000  -0.043  -0.107  -0.065 
(0.151)  (0.145)  (0.161)  (0.101)  (0.116) 
KiDIF (wage profile 
steepness) 
EMPDIF (employment  -0.054  -0.112  -0.052  0.042  0.035 
seniority)  (0.588)  (0.670  (0.607)  (0.314)  (0.374) 
UNION (unionized)  0.37  0.73  0.23  0.25  0.29 
SIZE (firm size)  2758  5900  1797  1009 
(8826)  (16363  )  (2744)  (1158) 
Cell counts are reported, except for employer  wage and employment differentials,  where means are reported,  with standard 
deviations in parentheses. 
Source:  ~uthors'  calculations. 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmTable 2: Ex Post Observations 
Whole Sample  Nomergers  Merners/Accruisitions  Hostile Takeovers 
































Changes in employer wage and 
employment differentials 
ALEVMED  (wage  level)  0.033 
(0.097) 
AWGDIP (wage profile  -0.022 
steepness)  (0.117) 
mDIF  (employment  0.004 
seniority  )  (0.743) 
YRAFTH (mean  no.  of years 
observed after hoatile 
takeover)  - 
YRAFTM (mean  no.  of years 
obaerved after merger/ 
acquisition)  - 
Cell count8 are reported, except for changes in employer wage and employment differentials, where meana are reported, 
with standard deviations in parentheses. 
Source:  Authora'  calculations. 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmTable 3: Probit Estimates of the Effects of Ex Ante Wage and Employment Structure on Hostile Takeovers 
Excludes Noncandidates and Firms With Missing Observations  Excludes Noncandidates Only 
On Union Status and Firm Size 
WGDIF  -  -2.19  -  -  -  -  -  -2.21  -2.08  -  -1.83  -  - 
(1.94)  (1.98)  (2.06)  (1.85) 
10.061  [0.061  [0.061  [O.  051 
EMPDIF  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  0.14  0.16  -0.08  0.10 
(0.40)  (0.41)  (0.78)  (0.35) 
[0.111  [0.111  [0.081  10.  081 
LNSIZE  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -0.14  -0.16  -0.12  -0.13  -0.14 
(0.22)  (0.22)  (0.23)  (0.22)  (0.23) 
10.071  10.071  [0.071  10.071  [0.071 
Log like- 
lihood  -22.83  -22.19  -22.59  -22.80  -22.55  -21.95  -22.36  -22.54  -21.72  -25.19  -24.78  -25.06  -25.25 
Prob. at  0.10  0.10  0.10  0.10  0.09  0.09  0.10  0.10  0.09  0.07  0.07  0.07  0.07 
means 
LEVMED =  employer-specific level of median wage; WGDIF =  employer-specific inter-Job-level  wage difference; WGXEM  = 
interaction  between WGDIF and PIDIF  ;  EMPDIF = employer-specif  ic inter-  job-level  employment difference;  UN = union status 
(=I  if 25% unionized); LNSIZE = log of firm size.  Standard errors are reported in parentheses.  The intercepts are not 
reported.  In columns (1)-(91,  there are 7 hostile takeovers and 64  other observations.  In columns (10)-(13);  there 
are 7  hostile takeovers and 92  other observations.  The last row reports the estimated probability of a  hostile takeover 
at the sample means; the numbers in square brackets report the estimated probability following a one-standard-deviation 
increase in the variable in each row, holding the other variables at the sample means. 
Source:  Authors' calculations. 
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clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmTable 5:  Effects of Hostile Takeovers on Firm Wage and Employment Structure 
Dependent 
Variable:  ALEVMED  AWGDIF  AWGXEM  AEMPDIF  ALEVMED  AWGDIF  AWGXEM  AEMPDIF 
INTERCEPT  0.025  -0.021  0.013  0.015  0.025  -0.021  0.013  0.015 
(0.009)  (0.011)  (0.022)  (0.069)  (0.009)  (0.011)  (0.022)  (0.069) 
YRAFTH  -  -  -  -  -0.006  -0.013  0.038  0.038 
(0.012)  (0.015)  (0.030)  (0.095) 
H = dummy variable indicating hostile takeover; YRAFTH = years elapsed after hostile takeover 
(PO  for other firms).  See footnotes to table 3  for other variable definitions.  Standard 
errors are reported in parentheses.  There are 123  observations. 
Source:  Authors'  calculations. 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmTable 6: Differential Effects of Hostile Takeovers and Mergers and Acquisitions 
On Firm Wage and Employment Structure 
Dependent 
Variable:  ALEVMED  AWGDIF  AWGXEM  AEMPDIF  ALEVMED  AWGDIF  AWGXEM  AEMPDIF 
INTERCEPT  0.030  -0.020  0.017  0.030  0.030  -0.020  0.017  0.030 
(0.009) (0.012) (0.023) (0.074)  (0.009) (0.012) (0.023) (0.074) 
YRAFTH  -  -  -  -  -0.006  -0.013  0.038  0.038 
(0.012) (0.015) (0.030) (0.096) 
YRAFTM  -  -  -  -  0.015  -0.013  0.009  -0.019 
(0.009) (0.011) (0.023) (0.072) 
M = Durmny variable indicating  nonhostile merger and acquisition;  YRAFTM = Years elapsed after 
merger.  See footnotes to tables 3 and 5 for other variable definitions.  Standard errors are 
reported in parentheses.  There are 121 observations. 
Source:  Authors8 calculations. 
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